We have built an imaging system that uses a photon's position or time-of-flight information to image an object, while using the photon's polarization for security. This ability allows us to obtain an image which is secure against an attack in which the object being imaged intercepts and resends the imaging photons with modified information. Popularly known as "jamming," this type of attack is commonly directed at active imaging systems such as radar. In order to jam our imaging system, the object must disturb the delicate quantum state of the imaging photons, thus introducing statistical errors that reveal its activity. a)
Our secure imaging technique is based on a modified version of the BB84 protocol of quantum key distribution (QKD) 13 . Instead of an eavesdropper (Eve) located between the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob), we now have a jamming object (Jim) at one end and
Alice and Bob at the other ( and quantum-secured imaging (QSI) protocols. In QKD, a spatially separated sender and receiver use quantum mechanical principles to securely share information. In QSI, a collocated sender and receiver use shared information to securely query an object.
Bob already share information. Instead, they now use this information to securely query Jim by encoding it in the polarization of a stream of photons. This leaves the position and time degrees of freedom of the photons free for the purpose of obtaining an image of Jim.
If Jim were to try to jam this system by intercepting and resending the photons with false position or time information, he will introduce statistical errors in the polarization encoding that will give away his jamming attempt. As in QKD, security is guaranteed due to Jim's inability to measure a photon simultaneously in two conjugate polarization bases. 
where θ is the angle between the preparation basis used by Alice and the eavesdropping basis.
Jim's error rate (e J ) is minimized to 14.64% when θ = 22.5
• (referred to as the Breidbart basis 18 ). However, Bob's error rate (e B ) is independent of the jamming basis angle used and is minimized to 25% as long as Jim always resends in the eavesdropping basis 16 :
We use this error rate as our secure image error bound. If Bob's received signal has an error rate less than 25%, images obtained from it can be considered secure against intercept-resend jamming attacks. Images obtained from a signal with an error rate greater than 25% cannot be considered secure and imply that Jim was actively jamming the channel. This can be interpreted as a reduction in Alice and Bob's mutual information, which is related to Bob's error rate as:
HeNe Laser For our imaging protocol to be secure, Alice and Bob's mutual information after querying
Jim must be at least 0.1887 bit/photon. In a protocol with no error, their mutual information stays at its maximum value of 1 bit/photon.
In our proof-of-principle experiment, we use polarization-modulated photons to securely image an object in reflection (Fig. 2) . A HeNe laser is intensity modulated by an acoustooptic modulator (AOM) to create pulses with one detected photon on average. A half-wave plate (HWP a ) mounted on a motorized rotation stage randomly switches the polarization state of the photon among horizontal, vertical, diagonal, and anti-diagonal (|H , |V , |D , and |A ). The single-photon pulses are incident on the object, which consists of a stealth aircraft silhouette on a mirror. They are then specularly reflected from the object towards our detection system. In Fig. 2 , we show a non-zero reflectance angle for clarity. An In the presence of an intercept-resend jamming attack, the received image is the "spoof" image of a bird. However, the imaging system can always detect the presence of the jamming attack, because of the large error rate in the received polarization. In (a) the error rate is 0.84%, while in (b) it is 50.44%. A detected error rate of > 25% indicates that the image received has been compromised.
in the H/V basis, and similarly for the D/A basis. This removes the need for sifting bases between sent and received photons. Two lenses are used after the PBS to create four images corresponding to the four measured polarizations on an electron-multiplying CCD camera (EMCCD), which serves as a single-photon detector.
In Fig. 3(a) , we show an image of the stealth aircraft object obtained by this system. The image is obtained by taking 10,000 images containing one detected photon each on average, for random orientations of HWP a and HWP b . The final image is constructed by combining the four polarization images formed on the EMCCD, shown in Fig. 4(a) . The different pixel colors correspond to the different measured polarizations. An error corresponds to the case when a received photon is detected in the opposite polarization to that it was sent in. For example, if an |H photon is sent to the object and a click is obtained in the |V image, it counts as an error. For the case when there is no jamming attack, we expect an error-free image. However, some error is obtained due to imperfections in the PBS, and is in agreement with the measured PBS efficiencies. The measured average error of 0.84% is well below our error bound of 25%, indicating a secure image. Using Eq. 3, we see that the imaging system's mutual information is reduced to 0.93 bit/photon, which is above the threshold value of 0.1887 bit/photon.
We simulate an intercept-resend jamming attack on our system by intercepting the imaging photons at the object, and resending them with a "spoof" image of a bird. For simplicity, we resend all the photons in a horizontal polarization. Fig. 3(b) shows the received image in this case. The presence of the jamming attack is detected by measuring the error in each received polarization. Measurements of an |H photon in the D/A basis give an average error of 50%. Measurements of an |H photon in the H/V basis always appear in the H channel. Thus, when a |V photon is expected, there is a 100% error. When an |H photon is expected, no error is obtained. These error probabilities give an average expected error of 50%. Our measured error of 50.44% closely matches this result and indicates that the received image has been compromised. Also, the system's mutual information is reduced to near-zero, further verifying an intercept-resend jamming attack. We show the four polarization images and their measured errors in polarization in Fig. 4(b) .
While we have performed secure imaging using a photon's position information, it is easy to extend this idea to a photon's time-of-flight information. In addition, one can use In conclusion, we have implemented an active imaging scheme that uses quantum me-chanical principles to ensure security against intercept-resend jamming attacks. We have also proposed a quantum-secured optical ranging technique. We should point out that our proposed schemes have certain limitations. Our experimental implementation used weak coherent pulses, which makes it susceptible to a photon-number splitting attack, where the jammer splits one or more photons from pulses containing more than one photon 23 . This would allow the jammer to measure these photons in both polarization bases and perfectly replicate the querying pulses. 
